before O r the development encountering networks at an expanding and quickening pace. At of institutional economics and the reactions to it from sociology (cf, Stinch. combe 1989) . For example, different terms have been applied to the phenomena, e.g., webs, complexity, complex systems, interdependence, and interconnectedness-connotationsquite different from differentiation, market, division of labor, and a bit distantly, specialization, unorganized complexity, and environmental turbulence (Luke 1992; Luke and Caiden 1988: Hanf and 03Toole 1992) .
IMany practitioners face increased difficulty in navigating the nets, coordinating with net members, and discharging their missions (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984;  ~a y n a r d -~o o d y 1989.) J-PART, 6 (1996) : 1:49-74 least two characteristics typify these encounters: We become acutely aware of networks when they emerge in important policy domains where o~erational Droblems seem to erode ex~ected Derformance (cf. Nohria 1992) ; the encounters present organizational relationships that are descriptively, analytically, and operationally problematic. The variety of networked domains is substantial and raises questions about the adeauacv of familiar . -organization and management formulations for understanding the implications of this evolution. This is signaled by the proliferation of descriptive concepts about organizational arrangements emerging between the so-called extremes of hierarchies and markets<~illiamson 1975; Powell 1987) .' The result is an uncomfortable sense of analytical uncertainty and mild to moderate frustration with the inabilities of researchers to describe or analyze these situations in a crisp, potentially cumulative f a~h i o n .P ut as a question: Are the error terms in our 49lJournal of Public Administration Research and Theory descriptions remaining constant or perhaps growing? There is no reason to suppose they are improving (La Porte 1994a).
The evidence of quite complex networks in and among public organizations is a key change in the context of public work and a major stumbling block in understanding and improving public contributions to social well-being (e.g., Gage and Mandell 1990; Luke 1992) . I take up the task of exploring the 'This project was taken up in the context of a conference stressing innovation in implications of conceptualizing public organizational networks public management. ~t was perhaps fool-(PONS) from different vantage points with some trepidation. The --hardy but apt, for this gathering's subtext conceptual views of these phenomena are quite variegated, the -be: When is an new, and sweep of public organizations involved is remarkable, and the when is it history? When is an innovation genuinely an improvement, and when is it literature is sprawling. The article is a provisional attempt to an unexpected source of performance provide a bit of order.4 degradation? Answers depend on where one sits-in the net.
NETWORKS AS OBJECTS/PHENOMENA/FOCI
'For an affirmative view, see Gaebler and OF INTEREST Osbome (1992) and Osbome and Gaebler (1992) . Some applaud trends that show Public sector interest in networks is a current ex~ressionof public organizationsare O r many of the concerns that have animated those who labor in the being forced to terminate former functions, Public networkers are not often fields of federalism, intergovernmental relations, administrative among them due in part to their intuition reform and strategic management (e.g., Gage and Mandell 1990 ; that the quality of public and social life is em. Wright 1990) . It also underlies the efforts of those who L 2 likely in the long mn to suffer perhaps detect ineffectiveness in the public service and those who worry irreparable damage (Moe 1994; Jordan 1994) . Others are more sanguine, They that efforts to effect economies in scope and scale of the public are rarely interested in understanding sector, such as the current National Performance Review (NPR) public networks.
enthusiasms for "reinvention," will actually degrade it, perhaps irrevocably.
"not e in passing the enthusiasmirelief expressed by sociological/business administration communities in welcoming the Certainly, students of the public sector recognize that introduction of neworks as a metaphor modern organizational life is characterized increasingly by a intermediate between hierarchies and growing number of intra-, inter-, and transorganizational relamarkets (e.g., Powell 1987) . From a political scienceipublic administration and tion~hips.These phenomena are signaled by terms for management view, we welcome network theorizing that might inform. However, structure, such as complex systems, coalitions, various what one sees suggests a constrained focus on economic organizations and little forms of federalism, for example, marble cake federalism, acquaintance with the skeins of public communication nets, and allusion to the computer/electric organizations in evidence since at least circuitry metaphor, (i.e., as networks); the end of World War I1 (e.g., NASA, or military organizations, including the Joint Chiefs). If these are to be classified as characteristics of component relationships, such as interhierarchies, they are mainly so in formal dependence, tight (or loose) coupling, multiple horizontal or charts only, for internal behavioral vertical relationships between elements/members of a dynamics are importantly shaped by network; and formal and informal networks and internal political relations. I wish for a more heterogeneous range of empirical refer-* dynamics or process, such as bargaining, action, or ents upon which to base social theorizing information flows, and resource exchanges between net and our work. members.
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The metaphor of networks advances the descriptive discussion at least one useful step toward more specificity in characterizing the webs, interconnected systems, and interdependencies of modern public organizations. In the process, it presents a number of important conceptual problems and opportunities.
A variety of formal, theoretical languages seems apropos for giving a degree of conceptual and quantitative precision in depicting networks. Theorists have turned, for example, to graph theory, lattice theory, and social network concepts (e.g., Burt 1983; Friedell 1967; Wasserman and Faust 1994) . But these analytic languages are thin, limited mainly to small nets, and often too abstract to capture the nuances of relationships within the networks (dare I say systems) of interest or the more salient characteristics of different netlsystem architectures. We confront a theoretical shortfall, limited by uncertain, ambiguous, analytical languages and a paucity of elaborated formal languages to describe what we can perceive, imagine, and indeed converse about on the basis of implicit, analogical language and stories (Benz 1993) .
This situation need not call for practical or vigorous response. How urgently should we attend to public networks? After all, situations of conceptual and empirical ambiguity are more or less familiar, a usual state in a variety of academic fields. But most academic topics do not engage behaviors that include the potential that operational failure will exact large penalties and citizen suffering. Put another way, failing to understand network dynamics either in situations of change, like policy reform or implementation, or in operating systems that face severe external challenges that can lead to grievous, unintended, but induced, error. "Messing with networks is not always, maybe nearly ever, all that good. " Improved understanding and caution at this time of very substantial, induced institutional change is an unusually cogent objective. But what I suggest ranges across a much wider analytical and descriptive landscape than can be accommodated in this venue.
LIMITING THE SCOPE
Interest in network phenomena spans various stages or phases of organizational development: the formation and emergence of coherent policy, of issue and organizational networks, of self-organized nets contrasted to imposed or coerced ones, and of varied processes of market-like to hierarchical net stimulation (e.g., Cook and Emerson 1978; Benson 1983; Ansell 1993) ; 'Issues here would include questions about how the public interest is defined, and agreed upon, and the shifting responsibilities of citizens and citizenship when nets evolve and are transformed beyond citizens' abilities to comprehend. I am grateful to Don Kettl for pointing out these and other aspects of the second and third items.
'Some readers may also notice another limit to this discussion. I shall hold to the tradition of examining those networks that the dynamics of post emergent nets that involve the operation of extendedldistributed networks where goal making is shared responsibility and accountability is equivocal, or that implement systematic change, the reordering of relationships within established networks that are beyond the stages of early equivocality (Weick 1979) , and to a lesser degree, the decline or devolution of networks as they decay and reassemble as a consequence of downsizing and/or decentralization; and the evolution and propagation of network dynamics and effects on the broader, superordinate nets of modern society, including the politics of public policy/operational networks (Galaskiewicz 1979; Laumann and Knoke 1987; Marin and Mayntz 1992; O'Toole 1993b; Scharpf 1993) .' are based on functional or policy design rather than those that are exhibited in Each of these perspectives poses somewhat novel, but social groups such as families, clans, or small communities (see Ekeh 1974; cf. related, analytical and empirical questions and conceptual Mizruchi 1994) . MY thanks to Chris puzzles. Each contributes answers to the others. To address all of Ansell for this refeience and distinction. them in the compass of one article would tax the readers' patience. Therefore, I will limit my attention to the second 'Examples range from the technoplexes of NASA and the FAA's air traffic control emphasis-the behavior of established, operating organizational system, and the CDC'S equally widenewor-ks-addressing the conceptual puzzles rather than the spread systems for monitoring the spread equally important policy implications of network operations." of contagion to the legal rule-based systems of financial regulation and the federal judicial appeal process.
My empirical referents are large-scale organizational combines, networks of at least moderately coherent, integrated units -"'Defining networks becomes a sllpper~, (e.g., administrative agencies, contracting firms, regulatory agenswampy business. While intuitivelythe cies, overseeing b o d i e~) .F urther, as a definitional matter, such notion has considerable appeal, there is little consensus on details, Definitions units exhibit more or less consistent relationships of exchange range from the most general ( M U I~O~ãnd and acknowledgement that each organizational actor (and its Rogers 1982; Fine and Kleinman 1983) , member representatives) can count on; organizational roles are to quite specific (e.g., Wasserman and Faust 1994) . more or less stable, at least within the last legislative cycle, and there has been a moderate consensus on the legitimacy of the net "The implicit underlying images of netand its rules of engagement.'' A key connotation is that network work is more than a synonym for system members are in regular, cooperative, or at least symbiotic, relaor an assertion of connectedness. The language suggests the root metaphor of tions with one another and that relationships are informed by a nets that could be used in distinguishing cohering, collective, or superordinate logic. and bound by a view of commonality, common function, and Landau 1979; Morgan 1986 Only to "fuzzy set" devotees (e.g., Klir and Folger 1988) . One begins to sense an affinity to descriptions of pluralist, interest group politics.
"There are, of course, other locations as well-as a "weaver of nets," as an observer in the exchanges that flow across links between particular net members, or as a outsider, a member of a group distant from the net proper but dependent and vulnerable to its collective effects, e,g,, citizens, consumers, or the netted, I4Note the parallels of role t h e o l~ and
Of organizational sets, (DIMaggio 1991) and various languages that have over the years attempted to catch the sense of networkedness (Stinchcornbe 1989) . Faust 1994) . When imaging public organizational networks, these horizontal nets, often spread across a wide geographic sweep, are joined by peaks of vertical links, status (hierarchical) levels in the interest of endorsement and adjudication, less often strong direction (cf. Cook 1977; Scott 1991) . Increasingly, there also have been symbiotic links to oversight and regulating net members. Our fishnet thus takes on a third dimension. Other dimensions acrete like coral (or perhaps barnacles)-nets of skill association, some of them professional (Galaskiewicz 1985b) ; nets of employee associations, some of them labor unions. Most public organizational nets contain (and are parts of) a number of nested nets that encompass (or embed) them-n-dimensional fishnets, so to say. These nets have many members; many members are parts of several nets. Nets often spread over many political jurisdictions, hence, then add more local members to the wider net (Wellman and Berkowitz 1988). Our n-dimensional fishnet now is quite large with many links between many members-a virtual cloud of members in huge "fuzzy sets" of connection^.'^ Organizational network analysis, intuitively attractive, faces a strong challenge of parts and wholes and levels of aggregation (cf. Haas 1975; DiMaggio 1991) . How does one focus on a cloud, a swarm, an n-dimensional fishnet? For reasons of research economy and analytical parsimony, we necessarily take a partial view. Each has advantages; each has its grounds for error. From the many locations possible in relation to an organizational network, consider three conceptual vantages that place analysts in quite different relationships to them: from within a net; in an elevated position above it; and alongsidelamong the netsI3 (see exhibit 1). Each vantage gives us a different prospect from which to see the network, its shape and architecture, its sources of coherence, and its flows of intra-and inter-net exchanges.I4 After an initial characterization, I return these vantages' menu of preferred conceptual interests.
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First, consider the view of a net (knothode) rider, near the middle levels riding on a fishnet node, a knot in the net, one of many organizational members. This is the view from a particular focal organization, a relatively tightly coupled concentration, a nodal cluster, floating within a dispersed, stochastic, often fuzzy set of net relations. It is an organization centric (OC) view, as seen by a major network actor looking out/up/acrossldown at other actors with whom itlhelshe must deal. Take as an example the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management within the Department of Energy (DOE) viewing the remarkable range of DOE contractors, research units, federal and state regulators, and stakeholder units of all stripes, and, more distantly, the specter of Second, take another view, that of a net thrower, positioned above the net looking down upon it as in an Olympian or plan view. It is a superordinate (SO) view, so to speak, seeing most fully the wider skeins of PONS that make up a modern society. From a U.S. state or a national perspective, for example, one's conceptual mind's eye rises above the views of its public nets as seen from within that of a particular organizational net member or a coalition of actors. From this elevated vantage, attempt to see a sector in a plan view or top down dimension, depicting the situation in terms of overlapping nets with different horizonal and vertical structures. View the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Air Traffic Control function, for example, as a system spreading far beyond the technical network of some twenty highly complex regions, each with closely linked enroute (high altitude) traffic control centers, (intermediate altitude) radar approach and departure controls (TRACONs), and local airport traffic and ground control units. Each facility also has an FAA Air Ways Facility (station keeping) element, an on-site National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminstration (NOAA) meteorology service representative, and often military liaison reuresentatives. Each facility also has regular relations with state and county aviation units, national and local user group organizations (airline operators, pilots), general aviation (GA) associates, a wide assortment of regulators, and myriad service contractors. At the
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"With apologies to chaos theorists (Gleick 1987) . The reader will notice that our analystlobserver has been placed in what J.D. Thompson (1967, A third, and somewhat different, view comes from a vantage among the nets, viewing the multiple nets of public organizations from the side, from a location midway along the operational vertical dimensions, running in parallel outside the net-a side long view (SL) . This is the vantage of the attentive outsider, a net puller perhaps hankering to become a major member or at least to be influential from a distance, at some remove from immediate membership, less vulnerable than a member within the net. This place among the nets, outside of several, is a location of someone (some organization) who has limited stakes in any particular member but is an agent who operates from institutional status level similar to some of those within the nets. A portion of the nets of interest would tower in institutional status over this observer, and some portion of the nets would seem to be below (perhaps beneath) observation. This vantage might be that of a professional association viewing organizational networks as habitats for the familiar informal crosscutting relations among professionals of various breeds as they follow their callings (Galaskiesicz 1985b) . Or it could be that of an association, various employees banding together from a number of agencies in pursuit of some aspects of interest or issues nets. It almost certainly is the view of those who wish to impose change upon ongoing networks that dissatisfy them-the policy implementors and reformers of every ilk. (It is also, I suspect, the subjective vantage of we who are students of public organizations.)
These three vantages or conceptual locations represent different research traditions-respectively, resource dependence1 contingency perspectives (OC views); recently resuscitated (new) institutionalism (SO views); and the views expressed in the study of federalism, intergovernmental relations, and implementation studies (SL views). Do the insights from one perspective inform us as fully and accurately on questions prompted by another perspective? As the intensity of network relations increases, do the errors stemming from the partial view of a perspective differ in seriousness? Put as an affirmative null hypothesis, as the complexity of networks increases, there are no significant differences 55IJ-PART, January 1996 ' T h e range of conceptual matters of most interest to analvsts of each orientation is cons~derable. shall note only those that seem to me to be especially salient from that vantage, leaving other important but less particular issues for later development.
"See Scott (1991) for perhaps the best summary of this sweep of organization theoretic notions.
"Note the salience here of the conditions that vary relative organizational power. administrative productiv~ty, authority structures, managerial discretionlaccountability for our public organizat~ons in advanced industrial democracies.
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in the quality and completeness of insights or in the seriousness of errors involved in the perspectives derived from one location as contrasted with another.
The claim here is that this null hypothesis should be rejected. Just as in the matter of policy preferences, in which "where you stand depends on where you sit," the location of one's conceptual vantage significantly colors what questions are asked, what explanatory puzzles are salient, and what meaning prescriptions for change/innovation take on. And, to recall what we know from other fields, it is likely that each perspective or location generates a spurious sense of completeness in which the observer systematically underestimates the degree of error attached to his/her views when they are generalized to the whole net (cf. Metlay 1975; Brunner and Brewer 1971) . We turn now to a more detailed exploration of the three vantages.16
The OC View of a Net Member
Much of organization theory, especially that pertaining to organizations within complex environments, is salient here. If you are an observer/analyst looking outward into the net, conceptions of resource dependence and structural responses to internal and environmental contingencies provide fruitful insight (Warren 1967; Benson 1975; Aldrich 1976; Van de Ven and Walker 1984) . Your interests will include ways of perceiving potentially ordered but opaque organizational networks (Mizruchi 1994) , and fields (DiMaggio 1983) , or sectors (Scott 1994) .17 While a focal organization may have reasonable information and discretion about relations with the first ring of net members, how is it to know with equal accuracy the degree of dependence or uncertainty attributed to the members in the second or third ringof the net-within which it is embedded, surrounded (cf. Granovetter 1985; Dow 1990) ? And the dynamics of decision proces-SCS, aS well as ~tII.lctLlral accommodations in response to these more distant sources of contingencies, need explanation (e.g., scharpf 1993b).
Further, the political dynamics occasioned by the focal organization's network disposition begs to be examined, because conceptions of power, stability, and discretion-as a function of the matrix of network relations-are often only dimly perceived. l8 Understanding these external network dynamics informs the views of organizational leaders/analysts about the potential for maintaining the coherence of internal action groups, such as its dominant executive coalition (Emerson 1962; Thompson 1967 ; ~f . Scott 1991) SO that its productive effectiveness is assured and, as important, the organization will be in a strong position to exert 56IJ-PART, January 1996
Understanding Public Organization Networks influence on other net members in its own or its valued clients' behalf.
There is another OC issue-the role of regulatory bodies and agencies as net members-that is more salient for students of public organizations than for those observing other sectors. Many organizational networks in our society, while they must confront regulations imposed via the legal system, do not include regulatory bodies as full net members. But for some networks, from an OC perspective, the analyst sees and must deal with regulatory nodes as regular members of the network-for example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for those in the nuclear power industry. Or observers see their networks' relations from the perspective of a regulatory agency itself-for example, the GAO with its field offices on-site in many executive agencies-and again the NRC with its network of on-site nuclear power plant residents. Thus, students of public organizations confront networks that include regulators as net members, at least as symbiotic-resistance generators-if not fully cooperating members. While net members with regulatory functions raise interesting strategic and tactical problems for other members, their presence poses more problematic questions for network analysis when seen from the global perspective of the (SO) view.
The SO View of a Net Thrower Observers and analysts talung this view would be drawn to consider the general properties of networks, their architecture and overall net dynamics. Analytical issues would include considerations of the basis upon which nets are stably structured, (i.e., their cohering logic); the form and structural properties characterizing network architecture; how network structures and dynamics reflect institutional norms and how their key processes respond to various types of institutional surround (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March and Olsen 1989) ; and, the analytical problems of describing networks when some net members play a formal regulatory constraining role rather than a formally cooperative one (Bardach and Kagan 1990)-this is of particular interest in the public domain.
7he Logics of Network Coherence. The network metaphor connotes relationships, between net members, that are cooperative, and to a significant degree self-reenforcing. That is, the relationships are cemented by something other than purely directive and punishment-centered hierarchical bonds (Gouldner 1954) . If not wholly self-organized (a property not required as a defining characteristic), networks are based on some common informing logic that is persuasive to its members in providing guides that order their relations with each other (cf. Scharpf 1993a). These cohering logics are a source of legitimizing and ordering member relationships. They provide frames of reference, order the net's functional core, and are a central influence in shaping the net's structure and sources of the net's rules of engagement.l9
One can imagine different types of coliering logics with varied consequences for net stability and behavior. An obvious ' '~n important determinant of the specific though sometimes overlooked logic is that of the network's tech- 
exchangeS.21
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Organization network research has not thus far systematically distinguished networks on the basis of their intrinsic ordering logics or principles, but the effort could prove fruitful. It is likely that different logics of network coherence produce significantly different structures and rules of engagement. For example, the functional logic of research and development lifts collegial teamwork between technical groups and organizations nearly to a principle of management; this resulted in the early forms of matrix organization both within and between agencies and contractors (Galbraith 1974) . This differs sharply from the logics of centralized management or market discipline as legitimating notions for network member interactions. Each of these is likely to prompt different responses in terms of network relations with regulatory members. Further, the basis for a network's rationale is likely to have different effects on internal dynamics and on the nature of the network as well. One incre~singlysalient matter would be more rigorous study of the dynamics associated with different network logics as expansion occurs, or especially of the downsizing of network members in various domains. It is likely that an innovation introduced beneficially in a net based on one logic could have negligible effects in another network based on a different logic.
Questions of
Structure. An analyst of the SO view would also be interested in the architecture of nets, their shapes, and the character of their structures. PONS are likely to be large, with many members, spread over wide geographies. Salient descriptive characteristics would includez2 the scale and general structure of the net (i.e., the number of members, the general pattern in its distribution of relationships [dispersedlconcentrated] , and the number of status levels within it. [cf. Boorman and Harrison 1976; Hall 1977; Aldrich and Whetten 1981; DiMaggio 1986; Burt 19921) ; "1 list many of the properties the readers will recognize as significant in under-* standing the performance, dynamics and evolution of large-scale organizations (cf. Oliver 1990) . The analytical challenges are in developing rigorous indicators and assembling credible data. the properties of its ties or connectivity (i.e., the degree to which ties are loose or tightly coupledlweak or strongly linked, and the degree of stability within the connected membership-their temporary, stochastic, or long-lived character, and maturity [cf. Niemeyer 1973; Cook and Emerson 1978; Povan, Beyer, and Kruytbosch 1980; Ibarra and Anderson 1993; Markovsky et al. 19931) ; the patterns of exchanges among net members (i.e., types and mix of resources exchanged, the relative strength of partners as a function of the types of resources exchanged [Ford and Fulkerson 1974; Aldrich 1976; Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden 19781) ; and 59IJ-PART, January 1996 the problem more salient in public networks than in private, economic ones-the structural accommodation to the requirements for legal regulatory and net members charged with assuring safety and quality performances (see below and cf. Laumann and Knoke 1987; Knoke 1990) .
Elaborating the structural properties of organizations, especially networks of organizations, has proved so far to be both difficult and subjectively unrewarding. This work requires more rigorous concepts and unambiguous indicators than have been available. Gathering the empirical data needed to give life to the indicators has posed a steep challenge (e.g., Blau and Schoenherr 1971) . But research programs that attempt this elaboration are necessary to complement network analysis based mainly on formal models of small scale nets (Mizruchi 1994) and to ventilate the heterogeneity of PONS that confront At the same time, this work should assist in developing means to detect the significance of mixed informal and formal elements in PONS.
Nets and the Dynamics of Institutional Norms and Constraints.
With the work of parsing the consequences of differing cohering logics and network architecture in process, an SO, net throwing analysts would also be eager to examine the dynamics of different types of networks as they respond to outside, perhaps institutional, forces. Such forces would include the legal constraints and social/economic norms that influence the net due to the imposition and/or insinuation of social or political norms imported into the net by its members. These norms, along with the net's central cohering logic, provide the rules used by net members to moderate their behavior and shape the modus operandi for net-related decisions.
In part, this work is taken up by the new institutionalists, who remind us that network structures and dynamics reflect institutional norms as well as the processes of resource dependence and contingency reduction, and who examine the ways various types of organizations respond to their institutional surround (Zucker 1987; North 1990; DiMaggio and Powell 1991) . Little of this work has been directed toward PONS though this would be most instructive for testing the generalizability of institutionalist findings (cf. DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Mizruchi 1994 (1992) and Axelsson and Easton (1992) .
Understanding Public Organization Networks
Net throwers' interests could also turn to questions about the capacity for nets of different types and dynamics to maintain their coherence in the face of precipitous and disruptive external events.24 Particularly interesting questions are those that pertain to the net's coping strategies and reactions, its power relative to competitors, and the character of its internal stability. Examples would be the unexpected demands faced by FEMA due to closely spaced, major, multiple disasters; the FAA coping with the loss of nearly all its air traffic controllers; or, more globally, the world's transportation or financial networks confronting the tumult of the Gulf War and Desert Storm.
Hollow PONs and Regulatory Members. Networks made of public organizations today almost necessitate dealing with net members from the private sector as well." In extreme cases, much of what goes on in some public policy domains is enacted largely by private contracts, a trend that has gone so far in some areas that it represents the "hollowing of the state" (Milward et al. 1994; Kettl 1993) . At the same time, a number of PONs, as well as organizational nets made up predominantly of profit and nonprofit members, must accept members charged formally with constraining, assuring quality, and stimulating conflict as well as the usually cooperating demeanor that sustains network relationships. Rarely have SO network analysts taken up the challenge of formally characterizing mixed nets, so to speak, or nets significantly made up of organizations legitimately (sometimes symbiotically) charged with constraint, quality control, arousing conflict and other means of reducing the independence of other members. The analytical problems of describing networks when some net members play formally competitive roles or roles of regulatory constraint rather than of cooperation are formidable, but they are necessary if we are to make much progress in using network analysis in the public sphere. Of special interest would be SO network analysis of those public regulatory sectors that the institutionalists assume will enforce the norms they argue affect the types of organizations they do study (e.g., Zuker 1988).
The SL View of Attentive Outsiders
This is a view of an analyst from outside the net proper at some remove from actual membership, placed among the nets. It is the view of someone (or some organization) without an important formal stake in any particular net member, an observer operating from an institutional status, for instance, of upper middle managers within the nets. A portion of the net would tower in institutional status over the analysts, and some portion of it could Seem to be below observational salience. ~n a l~t i c a l interests stem from concerns over penetrating the net to influence '"olicy Implementation could be, perhaps is, a perspective of a net throwlng CAO or of a very senior Congress member, who wishes to restructure the nets throws-the organizations called on for assistance, Or for which has Oversight responsibility. It would be useful for such throwers to give the sort of rigorous attention to net characteristics, and so forth, that I have suggested, but it is In fact quite rare, and systematic in the literature is nearly absent. Interest formally in implementation seems almost exclusivelv the Drovince of the attentive outsiders i disciss below. Few of themlus positions where we can carry out implementation as authoritative net throwers. More's the pity?
"other topics could include the effects of changes in internal on economic costs, the politics of competition among net member elites, and the effects on vertical network dynamics as a function of national economic policy or cycles 2RAnet's work IS the notion examined by Gene Rochlin (1996) when exploring the Understanding Public Organization Networks some aspects of its dynamics, for example, to decrease conflict between net members as in intergovernmental relations, and/or to assure the interests of a particular class of employee represented in many of the net's membership, as in the interests of medical professionals within health care networks.
T t~s view informs a number of current formulations of public organizational network theory, and it is familiar to those who study intergovernmental relations, Federalism, policy implementatioqZ6 administrative reform, and national security studies. I limit my discussion to three of the many issues derived from these fields and the SL perspective: the relationships between net members commanding different system status; the internal permeability of nets; and the effects of network dynamics upon the effectiveness of service. "
The effects of various formal divisions of authority among governmental units from different strata of a federal system upon system articulation is an enduring issue for attentive outsiders (e.g., Anton 1989; Elazar 1984; Kettl 1983; Wright 1990) . When these relationships are conceptualized as PONs, an important analytical issue centers on different mixes of hierarchical functions-directive, coordinative or adjudicative (Thompson 1967 )-and their effects in networks carrying out various operational missions. Hierarchies are designed to play-or come-to play-different functions for PONs. Increasingly, hierarchies play as important and adjudicative fUnct10n as either a directive or a coordinative function, especially as the technical content of the nets' work takes on a more and more so~histicated cast.28 At the same time, different governmental units claim or are compelled to manage various substantive functions (e.g., education for state and local jurisdictions, the national military), sometimes on behalf of another status level in the net (e.-g., when states or counties have to respond to legislation from the federal or state governments on social welfare matters). It is likely that one mix of hierarchical functions-combined with the operational requisites of a particular substantive function-produces more (or less) strain within a PON than in another mix of functions. A better analytical understanding of these dynamics would considerably improve analyses and proposals for administrative change."
Another analytical interest from the SL view would be the degree of permeability, penetrability, and coalescence that might implications of parsing a term with such a characterize subgroups or net members when they share common constluctlon.
concerns but are dispersed widely across a large network. These 2 9 ~ ~ matters are more salient to crosscutting, horizontal relationships present we have a very slim basis for advocating one type of administrative between subgroups among net members than are the hierarchical reform instead of another (Thomas 1993) . interests just discussed. They raise conceptual questions about 62lJ-PART, January 1996 30 For my part, one of the most unexpected was the discovery that the flight deck ooerations of some fifteen aircraft carrlers and the~r shore bases support groups in the U.S. Navy are, in a sense, represented by a quasi-professional association of Air Bosuns (the senior Chiefs specializing in managing carrier flight desks operations, one of the most demanding in the world). Every year Air Bosuns assemble with the blessing, if not the full monetary support, of the Navy to discuss issues of concern about flight deck safety, new techniques, and advanced design of technical equipment. These engage uniquely skilled men in discussions. in art. throueh the -medium of formal papers and conduct them in the Of and potential equipment vendors. As far as I could tell. Naval officers attend bv invitation only. "This is Chief's country," as one officer put it.
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the distinction between formal crosscutting arrangements (e.g., contract agreements or explicitly encouraged and perhaps supported occupational or professional associations), and the informal relationships forged between high-status groups or officials in one net member with like-minded groups in other net members, whether high-status groups or not.
Crosscutting, nonhierarchical relations between groups across a net can have both consensus building and/or conflictarousing consequences. The reader will think of myriad example^.^' Studies of the familiar crosscutting subnets of professions and union associations are, of course, important. But so are studies of informal group subnets and individually based nets that cohere without formal sanction-or perhaps even notice-in the interest of occupational stability but as importantly are drawn together on the basis of shared policy preferences and program implementation urges. The research challenges are substantial because data collection can be arduous and difficult, requiring anthropological skills, inventive conceptual work, and very considerable effort and resources (e. g., Ansell 1993; Thomas 1995) .
Finally, the relationships between PON characteristics and the decline or improvement of services to important constituencies is also of interest to an attentive outsider. These questions, perhaps in service to one constituency or another, are particularly apt in times of substantial, externally imposed restructuring, especially innovative downsizing. Such restructuring usually represents changes in the institutional norms or setting of the net. It almost certainlv raises concerns from established constituencies about trustworthiness in their relations to the net's members. To what degree do structural innovations signal changes in the net's stability, in its capacity to continue confidence enhancing --exchange relations, or its willingness to excise marginal or unproductive members? One of the more interesting questions has to do with the effects of restructuring that bears on network functions about which there is high consensus and uerceived -effectiveness (e.g., keeping safety as the top prior& for air traffic control) when network changes are imposed in the interest of other network functions (e.g., swift deployment of highly complex technical changes in the operating system). Those who promote imposed changes seem almost invariably to discuss such changes with the tacit assumption-or thoughtlessness-that the functions deemed beneficial will continue with unabated effectiveness. While this may be true in networks with some characteristics (e. g., with designed functional redundance and member loyalty), it may not be the case for nets with other characteristics (e.g., the substantive requirements of highly technical operating knowledge).
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The SL analyst is confronted with changes that are imposed by status levels of the relevant networks, often well removed from and usually much higher than the analyst, either as sources of data or as channels for feedback. Yet, as an attentive outsider, the analyst may have particularly acute, analytically grounded views that could enhance understanding and be the basis for alerting the net's constituents-other, less sharp-eyed outsiders. The analytical issues here would include factors that vary the net's permeability at the elite level, for example, the conditions of multiple access to elites (Ansell, Darken, and Parsons 1994) . But they must also focus on clarifying information on net structure and dynamics and the implications for continued net coherence as it faces changes imposed on political, economic, or social ideological grounds with little regard for functional requisites.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AGENDA
Each conceptual vantage of PONs discussed here prompts somewhat different analytical and research priorities. Each vantage implies a somewhat different characterization of the present network state and network dynamics due to intranet generated or imposed change (even innovation). Each vantage also necessarily produces incomplete description and analysis with its own sources of error. A key analytical challenge is to characterize the architecture or structure of a network so that errors of description and analysis are minimized. This immediately suggests the need for conceptual development, data gathering, empirical description, and more robust means of analysis. An obvious, perhaps foolhardy, course of action would be to attempt work that clearly draws on and tries to integrate two or more vantages. One senses, however, that the analytical bases for any one of these vantages is meager. Would combination result merely in the multiplication of error?
Space and wits are too limited to develop a rationale for the degree and character of errors, but they are surely there and a matter of importance, not only from a research perspective. For some large-scale, tightly coupled organizational nets, errors can be very consequential. For many PONs there is only a slim likelihood that alternative nets would be available as substitutes for ineffective or failing ones. In PON management, then, errors in understanding, in judgment about the sensibility of imposed changes-even innovations-can lead to serious suffering and can threaten the loss of political legitimacy (La Porte 1994b).
Almost any conceptual or policy problem of interest regarding PONS (e.g., conditions of network coherence, strength of ties, reorganization in the interest of improved productivity, power shifts, or the dynamics of policy nets), involves the assumption at least tacitly that some types of changes in a large network will result in beneficial new structures, dynamics, and/or levels of productivity. This immediately suggests the need for wholesale mapping structure and estimation of the dynamics of many net members in a variety of conditions. If my impressions are correct, we are not well blessed with method or conceptual categories to do this for much more than small groups, i.e., nets with n = 3-6 (for exceptions cf. Laumann and Knoke 1987; Turk 1977) . To the degree this is so, it is nearly impossible to examining anything of interest in public organizations with any degree of precision. An exception could be the analysis of small groups, say of decision makers, with such insights limited pretty much to the behavior of small groups.
I believe we are severely handicapped by limited means for cogent description, data collection, and formal analysis of PONS. As a result, our capacity to say much about the dynamics of existing nets or their relation to the formation of emergent nets is also limited. A major opportunity exists, therefore, for work that provides the concepts and empirical materials to explicate something like the following generic proposition:
Given network properties a,b then implementation of changes i,j will lead to dynamics and structural adaptations x,y.
One should hasten to say that this line of work will require substantial development in concept, techmques of access, data collection and analytical methods, and means of funding. It will be rather more expensive than the usual public organizational research fare.
With this brief exercise in exploring conceptual vantages and some of the attendant research implications, I turn to two matters of particular interest in today's public policy climate-public organizational innovation, and matters of public trust and confidence in an increasingly networked world.
NETWORKS, INNOVATION, AND THE PROBLEMATIC OF PUBLIC TRUST, CONFIDENCE, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CONSTANCY
Innovation in organizational practice and technical means is one category of changes that is sought by or imposed on public organizations. All changes said to be innovations are thought to be positive by those who seek and propose them. Those who impose them believe that they will be sufficietly beneficial to exceed the costs of damage done, either intended or unintended.
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In effect, innovations, whether administrative or technical, are imposed by a few (individuals or net members) upon many others in the name of their collective benefit.
But seeing networks through the lens of our different vantages, it seems clear that what is positively innovative from one view-say of the dominant coalition-may be the source of production decline or political degradation from another-say from the view of lower level net riders (cf. Polsby 1983) . Some changes may seem new or innovative to one part of the receiving net or community-say several net riders-but the same change may be viewed as old hat from another perspective-say to attentive outsiders-merely technological transfer or the diffusion of innovation. Network analysis from a variety of vantages, complicated as this may be, is needed not only to get a sense of the newness of change but to garner experience from the "old hatters" regarding the likelihood that a proposed innovation will sustain network coherence, stability, and assured service. This is particularly the case when innovation is really a euphemism for hierarchical disaggregation, deregulation, privatization, and increased technical virtuosity in the name of the so-called lean and mean.
The development of public organizational networks, especially those that deepen and extend a symbiosis with private organizations, combined with enthusiasm for innovation erodes two rationales upon which to claim the public's confidence that someone is in charge and can be held accountable, that a person with strong hierarchical power over subordinates will, if necessary, use coercive discipline to assure coherence and compliance in the interest of those served; and that market-based competition will root out poor performers, limit damage by the devious and criminally opportunistic, and provide substitutes more honest, more effective, and more trustworthy from among those available.
PONS as a natural and functionally necessary evolution either beyond hierarchy, or as an expression of the need for formerly incoherent, technically symbiotic groups to cohere cooperatively, can certainly be the source of inspiration. On one hand, the limits of hierarchical direction and inflexibility in the pursuit of some objectives may diminish. But on the other hand, without strong direction or effective substitutes for declining agencies, services that were once well delivered to groups can formally be denied to them.
66lJ-PART, January 1996
3'Especially by means of third party providers, and contracting out.
And, while innovation in the public sector may lead to better uses of economic and human resources, it is also a source of worry, suspicion, mistrust, and the potential loss of legitimacy. As I suggested above, one person's glowing innovation is another's source of dyspepsia. For example, if I do not believe that there are agents worthy of the public's trust within the deploying organization (now read PON) , what is promoted as innovation can just as easily be seen as a devious way for promoters to enhance their network status, reduce mine, and perhaps alter the emphasis on my worthy policy agenda.
With the relative decline of directive hierarchy, the increase in networked relationships, and attempts to innovate, the importance of trust grows as an adhesive or bond among net members and as a foundation of net legitimacy for citizens as well as consumers. A simultaneous encouraging of the extension of public organizational networks31 and the diffusion of technical and/or administrative innovations raises a problem too seldom confronted-the conceptual elaboration of the relationships of trust within networks and the conditions that earn distrust of networks as well as those that assure trustworthiness and institutional constancy.
To the degree that coercive, directed hierarchical power is replaced by cooperative network relationships of interdependence as the basis for integrating functional activity and exchange, relationships of trust between individuals, as well as net members become crucial for sustained operations. The importance of trust or trustworthiness is heightened when the parties involvedindividuals or net members-are functionally interdependent and when the failure of operations can lead to serious injury for one or the other. Networks employ fewer superordinately imposed means for assuring consistent operational behavior than either hierarchies or markets made up of competing hierarchies. As the criticality of operations increases, all members involved in exchanges seek nonpunitive, trustworthy assurances that their interests will be taken into account by those upon whom they depend (DOE 1994) . But we have little systematic insight into the conditions that produce and sustain institutional trustworthiness (Thomas 1994) . We have even less insight regarding the conditions that would result in the recovery of trust in organizations or networks, especially public ones, once it has been lost (La Porte 1994a).
Public organizational networks bear an additional obligation. The necessarily quasi-self-organized, limited hierarchical nature of PONS, and their position of near functional monopoly, means that the net's service consumers and citizens are likely to perceive themselves as vulnerable and dependent on network leaders' faithfulness to public values and goals. Yet network accountability is more difficult to effect: who is in charge, who to reward or punish? The unseating of an elected official is a gross and ineffective tool of last resort. PONs managing critical (and hazardous) functions where errors can result in grievous harm to citizens over several generations are at particular political risk in maintaining the public's trust and confidence. This situation extends the analytical challenge to include the problem of institutional constancy as well public trust and confidence (La Porte and Keller 1994) .
Institutional constancy3' refers primarily to faithfulness and unchanging commitment to and repeated attainment of pefonnance, effects, or outcomes in accord with agreements by agents of an institution made at one time as expressed or experienced at a future time. It would include assuring continued or improved performance in the spirit of the original agreement as new information, technology, or changed conditions develop. The demand for assurances that public institutions (often PONs) will exhibit conditions that evoke public trust and confidence and that seem to assure institutional (network) constancy escalate to the degree that institutions are perceived to engage in activities that can have significant, possibly irreversible, effects on future generations, especially if these outcomes might occur across broad spatial and temporal spans; stakeholders perceive that the discovery of potentially grievous failure may not occur until well after the working lifetimes of those leaders who set the programs into effect; and stakeholders suspect that agreements made in the present may be changed, denied, or abrogated in the future with little penalty for those responsible.
When these conditions obtain, our society's processes of accountability lose much of their meaning. When risks are likely to be borne by future generations, constancy will be demanded as a substitute for short-term production accountability. If the public cannot evaluate the network's performance on the basis of familiarity (the knowledge and information required being too esoteric) or on the basis for timely outcome (success or failure issuing too far in the future), they seek assurances that these 32Defined as repeated, faith. institutions will not compromise in pursuing the highest quality question. This means that the quality of both external net 68/J-PART, January 1996 relations and internal operations should reassure communities of interest and stakeholders that their views will be taken seriously and that organizational processes will result in immediate adjustment to the discovery of potential error (DOE 1994) .
When matters of institutional trust and constancy for public organizations are conceptualized from three net vantages, different aspects of exchange and the stakes in assuring conditions that produce trust and constancy become evident. Net riders seek to arrange relationships with other net members so that they can trust them and work out the efficient monitoring means to be assured that other exchange partners can continue to be trusted within more or less fixed system of incentives. (In a sense, they seek to reduce the transaction costs of incipient suspicion.) Net throwers examine the political, legal, and economic conditions that foster or diminish the likelihood that net members will become and will stay trustworthy. Attentive outsiders seek insights about the leverage outsiders can play as monitors or enhancers of trustworthiness, or as destroyers of trusted relations.
AN AFTERWORD
At the outset, I eschewed policy concerns in an effort to make this task more manageable. But I cannot avoid a foray in that direction before concluding. The metaphorical and conceptual hopscotch among the fishnets, net riders, and attentive outsiders of PONS prompts me to begin rethinlung key public policylpolitics issues in light of engulfing public network phenomena, especially in the context of advanced industrial democracies. Three bedeviling questions emerge as central challenges:
To what degree do the properties of different policy domains lead to unfamiliar political dynamics in the face of intensifying network relations (or networkedness)? For example, do the dynamics of environmental politics and policy procress differ much or at all from these dynamics in the agriculture, space, and oceans exploration, or in public safety areas?
To what degree (in the U.S. context) are transcendent, democratic, normative concerns transformed due to greatly intensified and dispersed public and mixed publiclprivate network configurations? Do the same issues stimulate different manifestations, enhancing or moderating processes as a function of network types?
To what degree (and to what effect) does the increasing phenomena of U.S. involved, crossnational networks alter 69IJ-PART, January 1996 the dynamics of and contexts for national agencies? As involvement grows, directly or indirectly, to what degree does this alter the operational efficacy of current practices, and contemporary, nationally oriented public administration/
